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exempted nonpoint source pollution from antidegradation review;
and (2) the EPA properly approved Montana's mixing zone policies
and procedures, which exempted areas within the mixing zone from
antidegradation review.
Dealing with the threshold issue of the appropriate standard of
review, the appellate court disagreed with American Wildlands'
assertions that the EPA's determinations involved purely legal
questions and that the court should not defer to the EPA. According
to the appellate court, Congress had clearly delegated authority to the
EPA to make determinations as to when water quality standards were
consistent with the Act. As such, the appellate court invoked the twostep approach to judicial review of agency interpretations of
congressional acts announced in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense
Council Under that approach, if the statute is clear and unambiguous,
the plain language controls. However, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous on the issue, the court must decide whether the agency's
interpretation is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
According to the appellate court, the Act was silent on the specific
questions raised by the case. Thus, the appellate court deferred to the
EPA's determinations, and asked only if such determinations were
permissible constructions of the Act.
Turning to the EPA's approval of Montana's standard exempting
nonpoint source pollution from antidegradation review, the appellate
court agreed with the district court and concluded that nothing in the
Act demanded a state adopt a regulatory system for nonpoint sources,
or gave the EPA the authority to regulate such sources. Thus, the
appellate court found that the EPA's approval of this standard was a
permissible construction of the Act. Second, regarding the EPA's
approval of Montana's policies and procedures exempting areas within
the mixing zone from antidegradation review, the appellate court
noted that the use of mixing zones was a practical necessity for
meeting water quality criteria at a discharge pipe and was a widespread
practice. The appellate court agreed with the EPA that the Act's
antidegradation requirements applied to the waterbody as a whole,
and not specifically to the mixing zone. Therefore, the appellate court
found the EPA's approval of Montana's mixing zone policies and
procedures a permissible construction of the Act.
MatthewJ Costinett

FEDERAL CLAIMS COURT
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313
(2001) (holding that water restrictions imposed pursuant to the
Endangered Species Act amounted to a physical taking under the Fifth
Amendment and were compensable).

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

The United States Fish and Wildlife Service and the National
Marine Fisheries Service (collectively "the government") determined
that delta smelt and winter-run chinook salmon were in danger of
extinction. In fulfillment of their duties under the Endangered
Species Act, the government issued biological opinions that the
proposed operations of the State Water Project ("SWP") and the
Central Valley Project ("CVP") were likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of these species. The opinions included Reasonable and
Prudent Alternatives ("RPAs") that limited the amount of water
available for distribution to users.
The SWP and CVP capture water from the Feather and
Sacramento Rivers and distribute it through canals to users in
southern California. The State Water Resources Control Board
("SWRCB") grants water use permits to the managers of the SWP and
CVP. One of the managers, the Department of Water Resources
("DWR"), in turn, contracts with county water districts for the right to
withdraw prescribed quantities of water. The water use restrictions
impaired contracts held by Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District
("Tulare").
Consequently, Tulare sued for compensation under
Article V of the Constitution for loss of their water rights.
The government offered three lines of defense.
First, the
implementation of the RPAs merely frustrated the contract's purpose
and did not effectuate a taking. Second, the restrictions did not meet
the criteria for a regulatory taking. Third, the government cannot be
held liable for a taking when it does no more than impose a limit on
Tulare's title that background principles of state law would otherwise
require.
The United States Court of Federal Claims felt the government
misapplied the legal authority supporting their first argument, Omnia
Commercial Co. v. United States. The court distinguished Omnia on the
basis that Omnia could claim only a contract expectancy, not
ownership, while Tulare had an identifiable right to a stipulated
volume of water. Thus, while under California law, the title to water
remained with the state; the contracts in question created a property
interest sufficiently mature to remove it from the realm of an Omnia
analysis.
Next, the government argued the water use restrictions did not
meet the criteria of a regulatory taking. Applying the Penn Central
balancing test, Tulare's claim must fail because regulatory concern
over fish and the de minimis economic loss limited Tulare's
reasonable contract expectations. However, Tulare argued the action
was a physical taking. Under that theory, Tulare possessed contract
rights to a specified amount of water, which the government prevented
them from using and thereby deprived them of the entire value of
their contract right. The court agreed with Tulare, describing water
rights as a special form of property where the mere restriction of use
eviscerated the right itself since the sole entitlement was to the use of
the water. Thus, the court held that the government's denial of the
right to use all the water to which Tulare was entitled accomplished a
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complete extinction of all value and effectuated a physical taking.
The government's third argument insisted that both the terms of
Tulare's contract and the background principles of state law imposed
limits on Tulare's titles that rendered their water loss noncompensable. The government contended that Tulare's contracts
entitled them to only the amount of water made available to the DWR.
Because the water was not available to the DWR, Tulare had no claim
to the foregone flow. However, the court dismissed the government's
legal authority as inapposite. The court pointed out the government
lacked the contractual immunity from liability they relied on in their
arguments.
Finally, the government offered a common law justification for
limiting the scope of Tulare's property right. Specifically, Tulare
could not have a vested right in a use or method of diverting water that
was unreasonable or violated the public trust. The court rejected the
government's assertion.
The SWRCB defined a comprehensive
scheme that balanced and allocated water rights among users in the
decision D-1484 ("decision"). Once the SWRCB made an allocation
under the decision, that determination defined the scope of Tulare's
property and contract rights. Therefore, the decision protected
Tulare's right to divert water, notwithstanding the SWRCB's
compliance with the RPAs.
Thus, the court held that the federal government was free to
preserve fish; however, it must pay for the water it takes to do so.
John A. Helfrich

Klump v. United States, 50 Fed. C1. 268 (2001) (holding the United
States Bureau of Land Management asserted water rights through the
same legal channels applicable to individuals, and thus it did not
violate the Fifth Amendment takings clause).
Luther Klump ("Klump") alleged the United States violated the
Fifth Amendment by taking his property without providing just
compensation. Klump made various earlier claims, which the United
States Court of Federal Claims addressed in prior orders. Klump's loss
of water rights remained the only issue, on which the United States
moved for summary judgment.
Klump had water rights associated with cattle grazing permits on
land in southeastern Arizona owned by the United States Bureau of
Land Management ("BLM"). During the term of the permits, Klump
and the BLM disputed over Klump's alleged failure to comply with
some of the inherent conditions, such as allowing his cattle to graze in
prohibited areas. As a result, the BLM cancelled Klump's permit,
ordered him to remove his cattle from the land, and impounded some
of his cattle. These legal developments prompted the Arizona

